How European Government Agencies Can Meet Digital Sovereignty Procurement Requirements
European government agencies are shifting from aspirational digital sovereignty goals to enforceable procurement specifications. In October 2025, the European Commission published the Cloud Sovereignty Framework (version 1.2.1), introducing eight Sovereignty Objectives and a scoring methodology that government agencies at every level can use to evaluate cloud providers. The Commission backed the framework with a EUR 180 million tender for sovereign cloud services under the Cloud III Dynamic Purchasing System, establishing the first operational benchmark for how data sovereignty is applied in practice to public sector cloud procurement.
This shift reflects a structural reality that procurement officers, IT directors, and data protection officers across European public administrations are confronting. The European Parliament’s 2025 report on technological sovereignty estimates that the EU relies on non-EU countries for over 80% of digital products, services, infrastructure, and intellectual property. European cloud providers hold approximately 15% of the EU market. When citizen data, interagency file sharing, and regulatory correspondence flow through platforms controlled by non-European providers subject to the CLOUD Act and FISA Section 702, the sovereignty gap between procurement intent and operational reality is significant.
This guide examines how European government agencies can write procurement specifications that translate sovereignty requirements into evaluable technical criteria, using the EU Cloud Sovereignty Framework as a starting point and applying it to the practical decisions agencies make when selecting platforms for sensitive data exchange.
Executive Summary
Main Idea: European government agencies now have a standardized framework for evaluating cloud sovereignty in procurement. The EU Cloud Sovereignty Framework’s eight Sovereignty Objectives and SEAL (Sovereignty Effective Assurance Level) scoring system provide evaluable criteria covering strategic, legal, operational, and technological dimensions. Agencies can use this framework to write specifications that distinguish between genuine sovereignty and marketing claims, requiring providers to demonstrate architectural evidence rather than contractual assurances.
Why You Should Care: The Cloud Sovereignty Framework is not theoretical. The European Commission is using it for its own EUR 180 million procurement, with award expected between December 2025 and February 2026. Any offer failing to meet minimum assurance levels across all eight objectives is automatically rejected. National governments are expected to adopt comparable criteria. France’s SecNumCloud certification already mandates sovereignty requirements for public sector cloud. Germany’s Cloud Platform Requirements set similar expectations through the Delos Cloud partnership. Agencies that do not update their procurement specifications risk selecting providers that cannot meet emerging national and EU-level sovereignty standards.
What Data Compliance Standards Matter?
5 Key Takeaways
- The EU Cloud Sovereignty Framework provides eight evaluable objectives for procurement. SOV-1 through SOV-8 cover strategic, legal, data, operational, supply chain, technology, security, and environmental sovereignty. Each is scored using SEAL levels from 0 (no sovereignty) to 4 (full digital sovereignty). Agencies can set minimum SEAL levels as procurement thresholds.
- Legal and jurisdictional sovereignty (SOV-2) requires honest assessment of extraterritorial law exposure. The framework explicitly evaluates whether non-EU authorities can compel access to data or systems through legal, contractual, or technical channels. Providers subject to the CLOUD Act score lower regardless of EU data center location.
- National cloud sovereignty strategies are converging toward EU-level standards. France’s SecNumCloud, Germany’s Souveräner Cloud program, and the EU Cloud Sovereignty Framework share core requirements around encryption key control, data residency, and operational independence from non-EU entities.
- Customer-controlled encryption is a foundational procurement criterion. Data and AI sovereignty (SOV-3) evaluates whether the agency retains control over encryption keys and whether the provider can access decrypted content. This single criterion separates genuine sovereignty from data residency marketing.
- The Cloud and AI Development Act will formalize procurement requirements into law. The European Commission has announced legislation to create a harmonized EU-wide cloud policy for public administrations, expected to make sovereignty procurement standards mandatory rather than voluntary. Early adoption of framework-aligned specifications positions agencies ahead of regulatory requirements.
The EU Cloud Sovereignty Framework: A Procurement Officer’s Guide
Eight Sovereignty Objectives as Evaluation Criteria
The Cloud Sovereignty Framework, published by the European Commission on October 20, 2025, introduces a structured assessment methodology that procurement officers can directly incorporate into tender specifications. The framework draws on France’s Cloud de Confiance program, Germany’s Souveräner Cloud initiative, and European regulations including NIS2 and DORA to define what sovereignty means in measurable terms.
The eight Sovereignty Objectives (SOV-1 through SOV-8) provide a comprehensive evaluation structure. SOV-1: Strategic Sovereignty assesses whether the provider’s governance, ownership, and capital structure are under EU control or exposed to non-EU dependencies. SOV-2: Legal and Jurisdictional Sovereignty evaluates exposure to non-EU legal systems, including whether non-EU authorities can compel access to data through legal, contractual, or technical channels. This objective directly addresses the CLOUD Act and similar extraterritorial laws. SOV-3: Data and AI Sovereignty covers control over data processing, storage, and encryption key management. SOV-4: Operational Sovereignty examines whether service operations, personnel, and support are conducted under EU jurisdiction.
SOV-5: Supply Chain Sovereignty scrutinizes the origin and control of hardware components, software dependencies, and subcontractor chains. SOV-6: Technology Sovereignty evaluates the degree of technological independence, including whether the technology stack relies on non-EU proprietary systems that could be suspended. SOV-7: Security and Compliance Sovereignty assesses alignment with European cybersecurity certification frameworks including ENISA, NIS2, and DORA. SOV-8: Environmental Sustainability covers energy efficiency, renewable energy use, and sustainability reporting.
SEAL Levels: From No Sovereignty to Full Digital Sovereignty
Each Sovereignty Objective is scored using Sovereignty Effective Assurance Levels (SEAL), ranging from SEAL-0 (no sovereignty) to SEAL-4 (full digital sovereignty). The framework establishes minimum SEAL levels that providers must achieve across all eight objectives to qualify for EU procurement. Any offer failing to meet the required minimum for even one objective is automatically rejected.
For procurement officers, the SEAL system provides the language and structure needed to move beyond vague sovereignty requirements in tender documents. Instead of specifying that providers must “ensure data sovereignty,” agencies can require specific SEAL levels for specific objectives. For example, a tender for citizen data processing could require SEAL-3 or above for SOV-2 (legal sovereignty) and SOV-3 (data sovereignty), while accepting SEAL-2 for SOV-8 (environmental sustainability).
Translating the Framework into Procurement Specifications
Critical Criteria for Sensitive Data Platforms
Government agencies procuring platforms for secure file sharing, interagency communications, and citizen data processing should prioritize four of the eight Sovereignty Objectives in their specifications.
Legal and Jurisdictional Sovereignty (SOV-2) is the single most consequential criterion. Procurement specifications should require providers to disclose all jurisdictions whose laws apply to their corporate structure, operations, personnel, and data processing activities. The specification should explicitly ask whether any non-EU government entity can compel the provider to produce, disclose, or provide access to agency data through any legal mechanism, including national security orders, law enforcement subpoenas, or intelligence collection authorities. Providers subject to the CLOUD Act must answer affirmatively regardless of where data is physically stored.
Data Sovereignty (SOV-3) specifications should require providers to document their encryption architecture in detail. Key questions include whether the agency generates and retains its own encryption keys, whether the provider can access decrypted content under any circumstances, and whether encryption key management is technically separated from the data processing environment. The distinction between provider-managed keys (where the provider can decrypt) and customer-controlled keys (where the provider cannot) is the practical line between data residency and data sovereignty.
Operational Sovereignty (SOV-4) specifications should address whether service operations, maintenance, and support are conducted exclusively by EU-based personnel under EU jurisdiction. Agencies should require disclosure of any remote access capabilities from non-EU locations and any circumstances under which non-EU personnel could access agency environments.
Supply Chain Sovereignty (SOV-5) specifications should require transparency about subcontractor chains, particularly whether the underlying infrastructure depends on non-EU cloud platforms that reintroduce the jurisdictional exposure that sovereignty procurement seeks to eliminate.
Writing Evaluable Specifications: A Practical Approach
Effective sovereignty procurement specifications translate policy requirements into yes/no technical questions and documented evidence requirements. For each priority Sovereignty Objective, specifications should include a mandatory disclosure requirement (what the provider must reveal), an evaluation criterion (how responses are scored), and an evidence standard (what documentation proves compliance).
For encryption key management, the specification might read: “The provider shall document the complete encryption key lifecycle, including key generation, storage, rotation, and destruction. The agency shall retain exclusive control over encryption keys in its own hardware security module (HSM) or equivalent key management system. The provider shall demonstrate, through architectural documentation and independent verification, that it cannot access decrypted agency data under any circumstances, including under legal compulsion from any jurisdiction.”
For data residency, the specification might require: “All agency data, including primary storage, backups, replicas, and metadata, shall reside exclusively within [specified EU member state(s)]. The provider shall implement technical controls that prevent data from leaving designated geographic boundaries and shall provide continuous audit logging of data location. The agency shall have the ability to verify data residency independently.”
For vendor independence, the specification should state: “The provider shall demonstrate that the agency can exit the arrangement without data loss or service disruption. All agency data shall be exportable in standard, non-proprietary formats. The provider shall document a tested transition plan including timeline, resource requirements, and data migration procedures.”
National Sovereignty Strategies Agencies Should Align With
France: SecNumCloud and Cloud de Confiance
France’s approach is the most prescriptive in Europe. ANSSI’s SecNumCloud certification (v3.2) mandates that certified providers localize all customer and technical data in the EU, conduct all system support within the EU by EU-based personnel, and comply with ownership restrictions that limit non-EU shareholders to below 25% individually and 39% collectively. SecNumCloud certification is mandatory for French public sector cloud procurement and increasingly influential for critical infrastructure providers in health, energy, finance, and transport. Microsoft’s partnership with Bleu (Orange/Capgemini joint venture) and Google’s partnership with S3NS (Thales) reflect the operational weight of these requirements.
Germany: Cloud Platform Requirements and Delos Cloud
Germany’s approach operates through the Cloud Platform Requirements established by the German government, implemented through the Delos Cloud partnership (an SAP subsidiary operating Microsoft technologies under German control). Germany’s IT-Planungsrat coordinates public sector IT standards across federal and state governments. For German agencies, BaFin’s supervisory expectations on cloud outsourcing and the BSI’s technical guidelines provide additional requirements that complement EU-level frameworks. Agencies procuring for German federal or Länder use should incorporate both EU Cloud Sovereignty Framework criteria and German-specific requirements.
Convergence Toward EU Standards
The European Commission has announced the Cloud and AI Development Act (CAIDA), expected to create a single EU-wide cloud policy for public administrations with harmonized procurement standards. This legislation will likely draw heavily on the Cloud Sovereignty Framework’s eight objectives and SEAL methodology. Agencies that align procurement specifications with the framework now will be positioned to meet CAIDA requirements when they become binding, rather than needing to re-procure or renegotiate existing arrangements.
The Sovereignty Gap in Current Procurement Practice
Why “EU Data Center” Fails as a Procurement Criterion
Many current government procurement specifications require “data storage within the EU” or “EU data center location” as a sovereignty measure. The Cloud Sovereignty Framework exposes why this is insufficient. Data center location addresses physical geography but does not address legal jurisdiction, encryption key control, operational access, or supply chain dependencies. A US-headquartered provider operating an EU data center scores SEAL-0 or SEAL-1 on SOV-2 (legal sovereignty) because US law governs the provider’s obligations regardless of server location.
The European Commission’s decision to use eight separate Sovereignty Objectives rather than a single “sovereignty” checkbox reflects the multidimensional nature of the challenge. Procurement specifications that rely on data center location alone allow providers to claim sovereignty compliance while remaining fully subject to non-EU government access demands.
Why “Sovereign Cloud” Partnerships Require Scrutiny
US hyperscalers have responded to European sovereignty pressure by establishing European partnerships. Microsoft’s Bleu (France) and Delos Cloud (Germany), Google’s S3NS (France), and AWS’s European Sovereign Cloud all position themselves as sovereign alternatives. These arrangements vary significantly in the degree of actual sovereignty they provide, and procurement specifications must evaluate them against the same framework criteria applied to any other provider.
Key questions for evaluating sovereign cloud partnerships include whether the European partner entity has full technical control over the technology stack or depends on the US parent for code, updates, and maintenance. Agencies should determine whether the arrangement has been tested against a CLOUD Act or FISA demand scenario and what the documented outcome would be. They should verify whether the European entity can operate independently if the US partner withdraws cooperation and whether the deployment architecture uses dedicated infrastructure or partitioned multi-tenant infrastructure shared with non-sovereign workloads.
Implementation: Building Sovereignty Into Your Procurement Process
Phase 1: Assess Current Arrangements Against the Framework
Map all cloud and SaaS services processing citizen data, interagency communications, regulatory correspondence, and internal policy documents. For each service, evaluate the current provider against the eight Sovereignty Objectives, documenting SEAL levels where possible. Identify arrangements where legal sovereignty (SOV-2) or data sovereignty (SOV-3) scores fall below acceptable thresholds. This assessment establishes the migration priority list.
Phase 2: Develop Framework-Aligned Tender Specifications
Draft procurement specifications that incorporate the eight Sovereignty Objectives as evaluation criteria, with defined minimum SEAL levels for each. Weight the criteria to reflect the sensitivity of the data and functions being procured. Include mandatory disclosure requirements for encryption architecture, jurisdictional exposure, operational access, and supply chain composition. Define evidence standards that require architectural documentation, not marketing materials. Specify exit strategy requirements aligned with the framework’s operational sovereignty expectations.
Phase 3: Evaluate Responses Using Framework Methodology
Score provider responses against each Sovereignty Objective using the SEAL methodology. Reject any response that fails to meet minimum thresholds on priority objectives. For qualified responses, apply the framework’s weighted scoring to compare overall sovereignty posture. Request independent verification of provider claims, particularly around encryption key management and jurisdictional independence.
Phase 4: Validate and Monitor Post-Award
After award, validate that the deployed architecture matches the tendered specification through independent audit verification. Establish ongoing monitoring that includes periodic reassessment against the Sovereignty Objectives, particularly as provider ownership structures, subcontractor relationships, and legal environments evolve. Include contractual provisions for termination if sovereignty posture degrades below specified thresholds.
Sovereign Procurement Protects Citizen Trust
European citizens trust their governments with personal data. Tax records, health information, social services data, identity documents, and interagency communications represent the most sensitive categories of information in any society. When this data flows through platforms subject to foreign government access demands, the implicit promise of citizen data protection is compromised regardless of what contracts say.
The EU Cloud Sovereignty Framework gives government agencies the tools to make procurement decisions that honor this trust. By translating sovereignty principles into evaluable technical criteria, agencies can select platforms that provide genuine protection rather than contractual assurances that cannot withstand legal compulsion from foreign jurisdictions.
Kiteworks Helps European Government Agencies Meet Digital Sovereignty Procurement Requirements
The Kiteworks Private Data Network delivers sovereign architecture that aligns with the EU Cloud Sovereignty Framework’s requirements across all priority objectives. On SOV-2 (legal sovereignty), Kiteworks’ customer-controlled encryption model means the platform cannot comply with foreign government decryption demands because it does not hold encryption keys. On SOV-3 (data sovereignty), agencies generate and retain keys in their own HSM, ensuring technical impossibility of unauthorized access.
Kiteworks deploys as a single-tenant instance on dedicated European infrastructure, addressing SOV-4 (operational sovereignty) through isolated environments that are not shared with other tenants or jurisdictions. Built-in geofencing enforces data residency at the platform level, providing the continuous audit evidence that framework-aligned procurement specifications require. Kiteworks supports GDPR compliance, NIS2 alignment, and DORA operational resilience across all sensitive content communication channels.
The platform unifies secure file sharing, email protection, managed file transfer, and web forms under a single governance framework, enabling agencies to address sovereignty procurement requirements across all data exchange channels with one architecture, one evaluation, and one evidence package.
To learn more about meeting digital sovereignty procurement requirements, schedule a custom demo today.
Frequently Asked Questions
The EU Cloud Sovereignty Framework is a structured assessment methodology published by the European Commission in October 2025 that defines eight Sovereignty Objectives for evaluating cloud providers. Each objective is scored using SEAL levels from 0 to 4. The Commission is using the framework for its own EUR 180 million cloud procurement under the Cloud III Dynamic Purchasing System. While not yet legally mandatory for all member state agencies, it establishes the reference methodology that national procurement authorities and the upcoming Cloud and AI Development Act are expected to adopt. Agencies can incorporate the framework’s evaluation criteria and SEAL scoring into tender specifications today.
Procurement specifications should require providers to disclose all jurisdictions whose laws apply to their operations and to confirm whether any non-EU authority can compel data access. The EU Cloud Sovereignty Framework’s SOV-2 (legal and jurisdictional sovereignty) explicitly evaluates exposure to extraterritorial law enforcement. Specifications should require providers to demonstrate, through architectural evidence rather than contractual assurances, that they cannot produce decrypted agency data under foreign legal compulsion. Customer-controlled encryption where the provider never holds keys provides this architectural evidence.
Sovereign cloud partnerships between US hyperscalers and European entities vary significantly in the degree of actual sovereignty they provide and must be evaluated against the same framework criteria as any provider. Key evaluation questions include whether the European entity has full technical independence from the US parent, whether the arrangement withstands a CLOUD Act demand scenario, and whether the deployment uses dedicated or partitioned infrastructure. Agencies should assess these offerings against sovereignty objectives SOV-1 through SOV-6 and require documented evidence for each, not marketing materials or partnership announcements.
Specifications should require customer-controlled encryption where the agency generates, stores, and manages keys in its own HSM, and the provider demonstrably cannot access decrypted data. This addresses SOV-3 (data sovereignty) at SEAL-3 or SEAL-4 levels. The specification should require documentation of the complete key lifecycle, independent verification that the provider cannot decrypt, and audit trails covering all encryption operations. Provider-managed encryption with BYOK (bring your own key) arrangements should be evaluated carefully, as many retain provider access to key material during data processing.
The Cloud and AI Development Act (CAIDA) is expected to create a mandatory EU-wide cloud policy for public administrations with harmonized procurement standards based on the Cloud Sovereignty Framework. The legislation aims to triple EU data center capacity and establish mandatory eligibility requirements for cloud providers serving public sector customers. Agencies that align procurement specifications with the current framework’s eight objectives and SEAL methodology now will be positioned for compliance when CAIDA requirements take effect. The regulatory direction is clear: sovereignty procurement will shift from voluntary framework to binding requirement.
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